Introduction
This paper is concerned with a radical reform of Scottish land law introduced as part of the initial agenda of the Scottish Parliament reconvened in Edinburgh in 1999 after some 300 years. The reform concerned provides for rights of public access to private land. 1 Access to land is of fundamental significance concerning issues of land governance, the theme of a conference 2 at which a first version of the paper was
given. The tension between private rights and the interests of the public may be seen to have a particular focus in the issue of public access to private land. The primary aim of this account will be to identify the scope of the new Scottish right in an attempt to determine the true nature of the change and, in particular, its significance as a limitation of the right of property.
The essential focus of the paper is on the "access rights" provided for in part 1 of the 4 This work is invaluable in putting the farreaching statutory access reforms into the context of the relevant common law.
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Since I wrote the conference version of this paper, Professor John A Lovett of Loyola, New Orleans, USA has published a very full and most valuable study of Scottish access following a research visit to Edinburgh University as a Neil
MacCormack Visiting Scholar in 2009. 6 That study is referred to a number of times in this revised version of my paper.
The pre-reform position
There is no delict of trespass in the Romanist common law of Scotland; the landowner has an enforceable right to require a trespasser to leave but there is no civil claim for the act of trespass per se as there is, on the basis of the "tort of trespass", in English law. 7 T B Smith (later Professor Sir Thomas), considering the scope of land ownership in his noted textbook, 8 
quoted the first Lord President
Clyde's dictum 9 that the word "trespasser" in Scotland is a popular rather than a legal term. The point here is that the civilian-based law of delict of Scots law does not recognise a right to damages arising from the act of trespass itself; trespass to land is only potentially relevant as a basis for liability where it has resulted in damage, 10 this being remedied by an action directed to reparation for patrimonial loss derived from the Roman Lex Aquilia. 11 The point, noted by Professor Kenneth Norrie in a recent authoritative work, is that it is "not damages for the trespass, but damages for the hurt to the property". As stated, however, a landowner can exclude one who has no right to be present on land and the remedy of interdict is potentially applicable to repeated incursions. 13 Even the right to apply self-help to the removal of an unwanted "trespasser" is, according to certain authorities, a circumscribed one.
14 Relevant legislation, 15 concerned only with possible criminal purpose, appears to reflect the common law position that the mere fact of presence on the land of another is not, in itself, a wrong in the eyes of the law. 16 Accordingly, on this basis, while it is correct to say that in Scotland there is no "delict of trespass", 17 it is "loose and inaccurate" 18 to say that there is no "law of trespass".
This legal distinction is sometimes misunderstood, or even denied, as in a work urging the opening up of "Britain's countryside" by a "right to roam". 
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The essential features of the reform
The Act provides, first, a right of access to all land and inland waterways for recreational or educational purposes and for any commercial purposes involving an activity that is not inherently profit driven 26 (e.g. access by a paid walking tour guide) and, secondly, the "right to cross land". 27 The scope of the two distinct spheres of the right -respectively, access for recreational, educational or certain commercial purposes, and for crossing (i.e. passage) -are clarified by the provisions of the legislation. The recreational, educational or potentially commercial aspect is stated to refer to "going into, passing over and remaining on it [i.e. the land] for any of those purposes and then leaving it, or any combination of those". 28 The crossing aspect refers to "going into it, passing over it and leaving it all for the purpose of getting from one place outside the land to another such place".
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Importantly, the right in both its aspects is subject to a general exclusion and a limited category of particular exclusions. The general one of responsible exercise is integral to the definition of the scope of the right in that it applies in every instance of the right's availability. This important limitation of the right and its correlative -the landowner's obligation -will be considered before looking at the (obviously different in kind) specific "context of application" limits. By reason of its generality the responsible conduct limit is the most significant qualification of the right. But certain specific conduct limits are also relevant to the quite complex definition of the right.
These will be noted in the following section after comment on the generic responsible conduct qualification. The exclusion of certain categories of land is another aspect of the scope of the right but, being distinct from the limits concerned with conduct, this issue will be dealt with in a separate section.
An important feature of the legislation is a significant local authority function in respect of the facilitation and upholding of access rights. This is provided for in It is evident from these provisions -and appeared to be recognised by counsel on both sides -that the notion of acting "responsibly" plays an important part in the scheme of the legislation. Thus a person taking access to land has no right of access if he is not acting "responsibly" (section 2(1)). An attempt to add some precision to the broad concept of "responsible exercise" is to be found in section 2(3). The access-taker is also presumed, subject to certain qualifications, to be exercising access rights responsibly if those rights are exercised so as not to cause unreasonable interference with the rights of any other person (section 2(2)).
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This authoritative interpretation of the core "responsible exercise" criterion is significant in confirming that having access rights "only if they are exercised responsibly" means that the right is denied to a taker not acting responsibly.
Presenting the proposition in the negative is an acknowledgement of the inherent position of a circumscribed right.
The issue as to whether or not access rights are disallowed because of unreasonable interference with another's existing rights is potentially controversial but, as indicated, the Act clarifies matters to the extent of the specific exclusion of access rights in a mixed category of situations. In these particular circumstances the issue of responsible exercise does not arise because access is disallowed. Reading ss 6(1)(e), 7(b) and 9(g) together, it would appear that the access right over a golf course is limited to crossing, provided this does not involve traversing a green. The Code para 2.2 of the Access Code (see below section 5) refers to golf as open to access "but only for crossing them and providing that you do not take access across greens or interfere with any games of golf". Rather surprisingly the Code (in the Part 5 Practical Guide) envisages the possibility of cyclists and horse riders on golf courses but they "need to keep to paths at all times and not go on to any other part of the course". A recent dictum of Sheriff Holligan recognises the significance of the "responsible exercise" qualification in terms of the availability of the access right. Elaborating on the comment that "it is important to note that a person only has such rights if they are 'exercised responsibly'" the learned Sheriff went on to comment:
Accordingly, in my opinion, by prescribing that a person has access rights only if exercised responsibly, it follows that should a person purport to exercise the rights in a way which is irresponsible, such a person is no longer exercising access rights conferred by the 2003 Act and is therefore no longer entitled to such protection as the 2003 Act confers upon someone who does exercise the rights responsibly.
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It is submitted that this dictum is consistent with the Court of Session one in Tuley quoted above.
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A possible example of irresponsible behaviour would be an access taker's refusing to take an alternative route when requested to do so because crop spraying is affecting the safety of using the preferred route. 42 Proceeding in these circumstances would not be responsible and the right would be disallowed with the consequence that the landowner's common law right to require and, if necessary, enforce removal would be restored.
A landowner's reciprocal obligation
As indicated, the Act introduced a regime in which the primary right is a prescribed entitlement to responsibly exercised access to another's land. The right necessarily involves a correlative obligation to accede to responsibly exercised access within the prescribed limits, but the Act goes further in a section providing for the "reciprocal obligations of owners". 43 This section imposes a duty on "every owner of land in respect of which access rights are exercisable -(a) to use and manage the land;
and (b) equestrian use of a path as a protection against erosion which might make it unsuitable for walkers. It was argued that even though damage was likely to occur, horse riders had rights of access which they were entitled to exercise over suitable tracks and, on this basis, it was premature and irresponsible to close routes in anticipation of possible damage. The court rejected this position and found, rather, that the Tuleys had embarked on "a responsible exercise of land management" and that they were seeking to make the different access activities "compatible inter se" in a manner consistent with and "in furtherance of their principal duty in section 3(1) of the Act". 49 An important part of the decision in Tuley is its recognition of a link between a landowner's purpose in doing something in the legitimate use or development of the land and the "scheme of the Act" 50 factor of responsible exercise. Noting the subjective nature of the notion of "purpose" the Court first observes that the scheme of the Act, and its reliance on the very protean concepts of acting "responsibly" if anything endorses that subjective approach, which ultimately may focus on the bona fides of the landowner.
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The opinion goes on to note that in the context of section 14(1) of the Act, it envisages many agricultural activities which may have the foreseeable result of preventing responsible access but which is done for the wider purpose of the agricultural management of the land.
52
This linking is of obvious importance in its recognition that the landowner's legitimate use of the land concerned will be relevant to the decision whether or not an access taker's conduct is a "responsible exercise".
The crop spraying example given in the previous section 53 is an illustration of an "agricultural or other operation on the land" providing a legitimate basis for the suspension of access because it would clearly not be an operation carried out "for … there are two types of case in which a purported access taker may not be entitled to take access: first, with reference to the land in question (a 'where' case), and secondly, with reference to that individual's conduct (a 'how' case)."
This section will focus on the domestic home privacy exclusion which, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been central in some contentious litigation. But, first, the exclusions on various particular bases will be briefly mentioned.
The Act excludes from the right of public access land associated with some form of works installation "to the extent that there is on it...a building, or other structure 56 or works, plant or fixed machinery" 57 and the land forms, either, the "curtilage 58 of a building which is not a house or of a group of buildings none of which is a house" 59 or "forms a compound or other enclosure containing any such structure, works plant or fixed machinery".
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School land is also excluded by association with a building (obviously, in this case, a school building) insofar as it "consists of land contiguous to and used for the purposes of a school".
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The legislation excludes land used for various purposes seen to be incompatible with a right of public access. The following are excluded:
Sports and playing fields in use (but golf greens, bowling greens, cricket squares and lawn tennis courts are excluded absolutely) and land developed for recreational purposes if access would interfere with the recreational use; fields of sown or growing crops; building, engineering, demolition, mining, quarry and statutory undertaking sites (e.g. Scottish Water); airport and railway land; land in respect of which access is curtailed under any other enactment to the extent of the limitation; shared private residents' gardens (as in Edinburgh New Town) and land in respect of which an entry fee was payable prior to 31 January 2001 and continues to be payable on at least 90 days in the year. unreasonably disturbed". 69 The legislation in fact says "that house or place" and so envisages possible differentiation depending upon the type of property involved. But nothing other than a variable measure dependent upon the circumstances could be apposite to the determination of the meaning of "reasonable measures of privacy in that house or place" sufficient "to ensure that their enjoyment of that house or place is not unreasonably disturbed". 70 In the scheme of the Act, land within the zone of the privacy exclusion is land over which access rights are not exercisable. This is made clear in section 1 establishing the right -"land in respect of which access rights are exercisable is all land except that specified in or under section 6 below".
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It is submitted that this construction means that a landowner can assert a certain sphere of domestic privacy and deny entry into that sphere to persons seeking access who, in turn, may challenge the position on the basis that it does not meet the relevant privacy criterion. It should also be noted that certain distinguished academic commentators appear not to subscribe to the interpretation of a sphere of privacy depending on the nature and circumstances of the property. a submission that the privacy factor was properly determined by reference to "the standards of the persons affected in the house i.e. that the test was "person specific"
and "location specific". 82 Agreeing with the approach in Gloag, the court applied an objective test in deciding that while the entire property was not excluded "a reasonably substantial area of ground" needed to be excluded to "ensure that enjoyment of the house was not unreasonably disturbed". 83 The court made the important point that the purpose of excluding certain ground was "not to secure the enjoyment of the 'policies' for the occupants of the house, but to secure the enjoyment of the house itself". 84 The end result was an order excluding an area of about 5 hectares around the mansion house. This outcome is broadly consistent with that in Gloag but the results are distinguishable in that the Snowies were seeking an exclusion extending to their entire 28 hectare estate. 
Scottish Outdoor Access Code
A part of the access rights package under Part 1 of the Act is the provision in Chapter 3 for a code to be produced by Scottish Natural Heritage. The Act provides,
first, that the Code should set out -in relation to access rights -guidance as to the circumstances in which "those exercising these rights are to be regarded as doing so in a way which is or is not responsible".
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Section 10 goes on to provide that the Code should also give guidance, on conduct by third parties -i.e. neither access-takers nor landowners -likely to affect the exercise of access rights; the use, management or other conduct by landowners in a way which is or is not responsible; and the use, management or other conduct by landowners in respect of which rights are not exercisable but are likely to affect the exercise of those rights on contiguous land.
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Published in 2005 the Code contains much useful detail but its "user friendly" composition does not always lend itself to interpretation of the Act. For example, the Act in section 2(1) says that "a person has access rights only if they are exercised responsibly"; the relevant part of the Code starts with the statement "[y]ou must exercise access rights responsibly", which is less strong than the formulation of the Act in that it fails to present the plain position that the right is only one of responsible exercise.
Sheriff Fletcher in the Gloag case did not find the Code of assistance: "looking at the terms of the Code it is clear that it is prepared as a practical guide…rather than an aid to interpretation". 98 Regarding the interpretation of section 6, on the important issue of the privacy of the resident of a dwelling, he took the view that "it cannot be said that the advice and guidance given by the Code is a direct help to the interpretation of section 6". But while the Code probably has limited utility as an aid to the interpretation of the statutory provisions, it may be of use in terms of guidance on particular issues.
Sheriff Fletcher in the Gloag case, dealing with the point that access rights "are available only if they are exercised responsibly", observed that a party engaging in conduct specifically excluded by section 9 "would not be exercising access rights responsibly" and went on to note that "[s]imilarly disregarding the guidance on responsible conduct set out in the Access Code incumbent upon persons exercising access rights would not be exercising access rights responsibly". 100 This reflects the wording of section 2(2)(b) of the Act. The Code therefore has a potentially significant role to play in the comprehensive range of particular matters of "responsible behaviour" by the public and by land managers provided for in Part 5.
The European Convention on Human Rights
Both the general protection of the right of property under Protocol 1, Article 1 and the particular protection of a person's rights in respect of private and family life and the home under Article 8 are potentially relevant to the question of whether or not the radical Scottish provision for public access to private land complies with the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Protocol 1 Art.1 provides:
(1) Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
(2) The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
The obvious latitude, especially in respect of land, for limitations in the public or general interest is confirmed in the relevant jurisprudence. 101 The recognition of a tension in the terms of the grundnorm provision itself has, of course, led to a 
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Of course, at the domestic level the implications of the required legislative balancing process must be considered and given effect to in the circumstances of particular cases. On this basis it is apparent that only relatively general precedents can be established in respect of the critical privacy issue under section 6.
The question of compliance with the fairly specific mandate of Article 8 necessarily involves matters more particular than general deprivation which, at the level of interpretation in a specific context, must of course be open to variation according to circumstances. The relevant article provides that:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
In the Gloag case 104 counsel for the pursuer argued that even though it was accepted that the access provisions of the Act complied with the ECHR, Article 8 remained relevant to the decision in terms of section 6 (1)(b)(iv) of the Act as to the extent of the land around the residence over which access rights should not be exercised. The point here was that Article 8 in effect mandated an interpretation of section 6 which took account of the personal circumstances of residents of the dwelling.
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It is submitted that the role of Article 8 is not denied in Sheriff Fletcher's observations as to the interplay between the grundnorm principle and the legislative provision:
[O]nce it is accepted that the Act is not incompatible with Convention rights and assuming that the court makes a decision which was correct in relation to sufficiency [of the land excluded around a dwelling] there would be no contravention…on the other hand if the court were wrong about sufficiency that decision can be put right without reference to the Convention because it would be a contravention of the 2003 Act. 
Remedies
The Act provides for the determination, on summary application to a sheriff court, of the central controlling issues of excluded land, responsible exercise by the access taker, and responsible management by the landowner. 112 There is also provision for a determination as to the right to the crossing of land by a path, bridleway or other means, and whether on foot, horseback, pedal cycle or any combination of these means.
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As urged above, 114 the better view is that the landowner's remedy has not changed to the extent that he or she may not apply reasonable means to obtain the removal of a party who has no right under the Act. In principle, resort to interdict also remains competent. Prior to the legislation the landowner could, in principle, always obtain the removal of a party present on a precarious basis. The position has changed to the extent that in a wide range of circumstances the access taker is present on the basis of a right, but if the right is forfeited because it is not exercised responsibly, it must necessarily be that the common law remedies are available to the landowner.
The party seeking access can, of course, seek a declaration from the sheriff court that his or her exercise is in accordance with the legislation. 
9

Concluding observations
Would it be accurate to say that, at any rate in broad terms, a technically precarious but de facto largely secure position has been recast on a structured correlative right/responsibility basis? For hill walkers one could hardly contend that the practical position has changed in any major way. On this basis, while the Scottish access to land reforms are from one perspective radical they may also be seen as simply making the longstanding de facto position of public access to the hills and mountains a de jure situation. But, as will be noted shortly, this is only part of the picture.
An aspect of the shift -perhaps insufficiently recognised -is the proximity between the former de facto position and the reformed regime, because of the critical factor of a right contingent upon responsible exercise. Session decision relevant to the issue has confirmed that the right is denied if its exercise is not responsible. 116 Arguably, the movement has been from a precarious position to a right revocable on the basis of irresponsible exercise -significantly, a qualified legal right. 117 The "responsible exercise" factor leaves the landowner in a position to assert his property interest albeit no longer on an arbitrary basis but only in circumstances in which it is under actual threat. Another relevant difference here is that the access taker's thinking now is that in principle he or she has the right to proceed.
But this characterisation is an oversimplification in a number of ways. Previously not well known in Scotland, "ramblers" have joined the hill walkers; the reforms have added a dimension and opened up potential access to land in general including much more than the extensive -and largely wilderness -hill and mountain areas of Scotland. Of course the "all land" aspect of the reforms multiplies the extent to which there may be a "responsible access" issue, because the likelihood of conflict between the access taker and the landowner is much greater in the context of developed land.
From the comparative law perspective of the conference at which this paper, in its initial form, was given, one can only say that the Scottish reforms reflect the trite point that the lex situs factor remains predominant in land law. Subscription to the ECHR supra-jurisdiction norm has implications for the form of any redistribution of rights -more or less as a matter of fair process -but the substance remains essentially a matter for domestic law.
The South African Constitution sets out a controlling agenda for land reform with major implications for the protection of property in terms of the position of the common law. As part of that development the landowner's power to evict has been redefined but without recognition of any general notion of public access to private property. However, as Professor André van der Walt has shown, post-apartheid case As a starting point clarification of the misunderstood pre-reform position is attempted.
The essential point is that Scots common law does not give civil damages for a simple act of trespass (as English law does) but only a right to obtain removal of the trespasser. Under the reforms the longstanding Scottish position of landowners allowing walkers access to the hills and mountains becomes a legal right.
A critical aspect of the new right is that it is one of responsible access; provided a landowner co-operates with the spirit and system of the Act access can be denied on the basis that it is not being exercised responsibly. But the onus is on the landowner to show that the exercise of the right is not responsible.
Although the right applies to all land a general exception protects the privacy of a domestic dwelling. Early case law suggests that the scope of this limit depends upon particular circumstances although reasonable 'garden ground' is likely to be protected. There are various particular limits such as school land. governance' -the subject of the Potchefstroom Conference at which the paper was initially presented -largely remains a matter for domestic law; the lex situs concept is alive and well.
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